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The Transparency Register: 
a European vanguard of strong lobby regulation? 
 
Executive Summary 
A recent comparative analysis of the content of lobby regulation schemes 
published in this journal casts measures developed at EU level as the 
vanguard of a ‘new wave’ of strong lobby regulation across Europe. Other 
assessments characterise EU lobby regulation as weak, primarily based on the 
voluntary nature of a succession of registers of lobbyists, as well as the 
quality of data within them. We examine these competing perspectives 
through a focus upon the EU Transparency Register (TR), now exceeding 
5,500 individual entries. We set the scheme within a ‘transparency for 
legitimacy’ pathway, and note its differentiation from predecessor instruments 
by its breadth of scope.  
We assess the extent of coverage of its core targets through a comparison of 
the entries in two of its categories (business related, and NGOs) with other 
information sources; we estimate its coverage of intended population to be 
approximately three-quarters of business related organisations and around 
60% of NGOs. These are sizeable proportions for a voluntary (albeit 
incentivised) register, but not sufficient yet to justify the ‘de-facto mandatory’ 
claim for it made at its launch in 2011. We then assess the structure of the 
register, the incentives to join it, and its population in detail. The quality of 
the data in the Transparency Register has progressively improved from the 
starting point of its predecessor schemes.  Nonetheless, there are one-third of 
all entries in the register which did not choose ‘European’ as one of the 
interests they represent, but instead another territorial level.  Whilst some 
data quality problems remain, with a fringe of questionable entries, the 
reliance upon those in the register to monitor it has driven up standards of 
data entry among the main lobbying players. Nonetheless, there are faults of 
design and nomenclature. A key juncture during the registration process 
involves a choice of category to appear in the register, affecting the disclosure 
and presentation of public information. We identify 15% of entries in the NGO 
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category which could better be re-assigned to other categories. We identify 
the boundary points from which the data can be put to research use, involving 
the identification of a ‘European interest’ represented and use of a Brussels 
address, which makes the data less prone to outliers. Nonetheless even after 
this operation there remain problems in aggregating data on some indicators 
(particularly head-counts of lobbyists) because of the extent of the extreme 
cases.  
However, some clear pictures emerge from the data; after removing 
duplicated entries from the Register, and discounting a small number of 
inappropriate outliers, we present the first such results from it. A key finding 
is that the differences in reported resources are less than might be expected 
between business related organisations and NGOs. One area where there is 
substantial difference concerns the receipt of EU funding for civil society 
organisations.   The EU political system has long had substantial funding 
regimes in place for NGOs.  We are able to provide the most accurate 
information yet available about the extent of NGO reliance upon EU political 
institutions.  NGOs with a Brussels base representing a European interest and 
which receive a grant from EU institutions draw an average of 43% of their 
budget from such sources.  
Finally, we place the Transparency Register within traditions of comparative 
lobby regulation. This analysis comes ahead of a scheduled review of the 
scheme by the European Commission and European Parliament during 2013, 
and at a time when most EU member states have established regulatory 
instruments or currently have them under active consideration.  
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Introduction 
A recent comparative analysis of the content of lobby regulation schemes 
published in this journal casts measures developed at EU level as the vanguard 
of a ‘new wave’ of strong lobby regulation across Europe (Holman and Luneburg, 
2012, p.91). Other assessments have characterised EU lobby regulation as 
weak, primarily based upon the voluntary status of successive registers of 
lobbyists, as well as the quality of data within them (Chari, Hogan & Murphy, 
2011; ALTER-EU, 2012a, 2012b). We examine these alternative perspectives 
through a focus upon the EU Transparency Register (TR), commencing with an 
examination of its features and ways in which the detail of the registration 
process might affect the disclosure and presentation of public information. We 
continue by contextualising it within path dependencies, and examine the extent 
of differentiation from predecessor instruments. We then assess the extent of 
coverage of its core targets through a comparison of the entries in two of its 
categories (business related, and NGOs) with other information sources. We 
follow this with an assessment of the potential and limitations provided by a 
substantial public database of 5,513 entries in the Register at the start of 2013. 
We identify the boundary points from which the data can be put to public use, 
and after removing duplicated entries from the Register, we present the first 
such data drawn from it. Finally, we place the TR within traditions of 
comparative lobby regulation. Our analysis comes ahead of a scheduled review 
of the scheme by the European Commission and European Parliament, originally 
due by mid 20131. We do so at a time when most EU member states have 
established regulatory instruments or currently have them under active 
consideration (Chari, Hogan & Murphy, 2011; Holman and Luneburg, 2012; 
JTRS, 2012a).  
EU lobbying and the emergence of the registers 
Whilst most developed political systems have substantial interactions with 
stakeholders for a variety of purposes (Halpin and Jordan, 2012), the EU is 
remarkable in a high degree of dependence upon organised interests to achieve 
its goals. This systemic dependence can be traced back to the lack of popular 
engagement with the EU, the need for consensus from decision making involving 
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(soon to be) 28 member states, the relative degree of isolation of the European 
Commission from other potential constituencies of support, and a chronic lack of 
resources in EU institutions relative to the substantive functions performed. In a 
quest for a variety of different types of legitimacies, an infrastructure has arisen 
to formalise exchanges with ‘interested parties’2 using devices commonly found 
elsewhere, centred on pluralist mechanisms of checks and balances and 
principles of transparency. Organised interests are also expected to play a 
systemic role of an ‘unofficial opposition’ in an otherwise consensually bound 
system, supported by a funding regime for (primarily) NGOs which often 
accounts for a high proportion of their income. Various interpretations place the 
role of organised interests in the EU system somewhere between participatory 
governance and attempts to stimulate a European public sphere (Heidbreder, 
2012). A lobby regulation scheme lies embedded within such a context. 
The order of establishment for different instruments which regulate lobbying 
at EU level conform to a pattern often found elsewhere. Measures covering 
the behaviour of the lobbied usually precede the establishment of instruments 
aimed at the regulation of lobbyists because the target constituency is easier 
to define and regulate. EU venues are covered by a mixture of staff rules as 
well as those for political appointees, mainly involving disclosure requirements 
and measures to avoid a conflict of interests. The latter are still evolving in a 
process of incremental, though lumpy, development, often following the 
interjection of civil society watchdogs, sometimes with the support of a 
European Ombudsman. At the time of writing, this alliance has resulted in an 
investigation by the Ombudsman of the handling of complaints by the 
European Commission to avoid conflicts of interests caused by ‘revolving 
doors’ of staff crossovers; there is already an 18 month ‘cooling-off’ period for 
Commissioners, and measures for staff have been under discussion with trade 
union representatives for some time. The European Court of Auditors has also 
recently scrutinised arrangements within some specialised EU regulatory 
agencies and made a number of recommendations for improvement 
(European Court of Auditors, 2012). Regulatory measures upon staff and 
politicians contribute important perspectives to analysis of lobby regulation, 
and we recognise these measures may well change in the lag between our 
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analysis and its publication. Our focus of analysis falls upon the principal 
regulation component which regulates lobbyists, the Transparency Register, 
ahead of its scheduled review. 
When agendas first emerge for the regulation of lobbyists, a common pattern 
is for commercial practitioners to establish self-regulatory measures (OECD 
2009b). These arose at EU level in 1994 in the form of a code of conduct 
which was to become incorporated within a new Accredited Lobbyist (AL) 
scheme operated by the European Parliament dating from 1997. In the same 
year the Society of European Affairs Practitioners (SEAP) was established, 
extending self-regulatory provisions to practitioners in (mainly) companies 
and trade associations. An amalgamated extension of self regulatory codes 
was incorporated within a new regulatory instrument established in 2008 by 
the European Commission, the Register of Interest Representatives (ROIR). 
One indication of its impact is that the use of self-regulatory complaint 
mechanisms progressively declined afterwards. In mid 2011, a new joint 
Transparency Register of the European Commission and European Parliament 
replaced the AL and ROIR schemes as the main device aimed at the regulation 
of lobbyists, thus covering much of the principal EU institutional venues of 
lobbying. The Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA) establishing the 
‘Transparency Register’ identified a full-scale review of the scheme by no later 
than two years following its entry into operation (Official Journal L191/29), 
reflecting a will within the European Parliament that its status as ‘voluntary’ 
would be re-visited at that point. In deference to this, the responsible 
European Commissioner (Šefčovič) identified at the time of commencement of 
the TR that a mandatory scheme was ‘a possibility if necessary’ (Moss, 2011, 
p.25), despite a view within the legal services of the institutions that this 
might require a Treaty change.  
The features of the Transparency Register and its registration process 
The Transparency Register involves the incentivised (but nonetheless voluntary) 
registration of ‘all organisations and self-employed individuals engaged in 
activities carried out with the objective of directly or indirectly influencing the 
formulation or implementation of policy and decision-making processes of the EU 
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institutions’ (JTRS, 2012b). The most distinctive feature of the scheme is its 
wide scope of embrace, with an explicit focus upon indirect forms of lobbying. 
Accompanying guidelines identify informal networks as falling within its scope, 
as well as indirect means of exerting influence such as events and conferences. 
There are a mixture of incentives to join the register, reviewed in further detail 
later, but in sum they include: the (in-theory) possibility to exclude non-
registered organisations from selective consultation meetings where there are 
other consultation opportunities (such as public consultations) in place; 
instructions to Commission staff to issue invitations to register in meetings; 12 
months accreditation for a one-day access pass to the European Parliament; 
naming and shaming non-registered organisations; and the option in the 
Register to sign up to consultation alerts for nominated policy fields.  On 5 
January 2013, our census date, over 97% of the entries in the register were 
from organisations, with the remainder comprising self-employed individuals 
working in a consulting capacity. Entries are spread across six categories and 
thirteen sub-categories covering the ‘usual suspects’ and beyond, drawing as far 
as think tanks, research and academic institutions, as well as some 
representations of public authorities. A registration can be made in any of the 22 
official languages of the EU, which in itself raises transparency related issues. 
We looked to see if there was evidence of ‘strategic’ use of languages (i.e. of 
non-native and less popular languages) in the registration process, but analysis 
of the relatively small number of entries in Cyrillic, and Polish3, at least, provided 
no evidence of this.  
All who register enter responses, via a web based interface, to compulsory 
information fields about: organisational details, contact information, and 
responsible individuals; spending on lobbying (and for some categories, income 
received by type of source); ‘goals and remit’; the ‘number of persons engaged 
in activities falling under the scope of the Transparency Register’; the names of 
any individuals accredited for access to European Parliament premises; and to 
confirm abidance with the code of conduct. A potentially important juncture at 
an early stage in the registration process is where a choice is made by the 
registrant of the category in which to appear in the register, because this 
determines subsequent data entry requirements. A general rule is that 
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consultancies, business related interests, and trade unions (i.e. producer 
interests, comprising categories I and II of the register) are required to disclose 
spending on lobbying (consultancies are required to disclose their clients with 
turnover related data), whereas for others (mostly4 non-producer interests in 
categories III-VI of the register, populated mainly by NGOs) it is optional. 
Conversely, non-producer interests are required to provide information about 
their territorial membership spread, whereas most producer interests are not5. 
These differences are reinforced by the presentation of registration categories in 
the scheme website by use of a ‘black bold line’ visibly separating producer 
interests from others (de Castro Asarta, 2011). There are options during the 
process to provide supplementary information in some fields, but a registration 
can be completed without answering questions about lobbying activities during 
the preceding year, or about membership of networks. There is an option to 
receive consultation alerts for nominated fields of interest. On completion of the 
registration process, an entry is published on the web automatically, i.e. without 
prior review by EU institutions. A search engine permits a limited number of 
data-fields to be examined and cross-referenced, with the selection of enquiry 
fields seemingly driven mainly by the needs of EU institutions to identify 
consultees. 
The scheme is overseen and administered by an inter-institutional 
(Commission/Parliament) Joint Transparency Register Secretariat (JTRS), in 
which the equivalent of four full-time staff is deployed at any one time (JTRS, 
2012a). Its work includes a limited extent of data checks, administering 
complaints procedures, and the imposition of sanctions ranging from withdrawal 
of access to an EP building pass through to those with reputational 
consequences. The JTRS does not undertake routine checks of the registration 
entries because of a European Commission preference to avoid overtones of 
accreditation, as well as a lack of resources to do so6. The JTRS does undertake 
random quality checks, as well as ‘targeted’ data fields which are identified on 
the TR web pages as subject to particular scrutiny. One field flagged in this way 
is the category of entry chosen by registrants, because producer related 
interests can avoid disclosing financial information by selecting other categories. 
There are some design faults which provide opportunities for mis-categorisation. 
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A question which asks ‘in which section do you want to register?’ seems to invite 
deliberation and choice. Accidents of nomenclature might seem to justify the 
selection by producer related organisations of an alternative sub-category ‘non-
governmental organisations, platforms and networks and similar’ or another for 
‘other mixed entities’. While the latter category did not seem to contain any such 
dubious entries, we identified 235 entries of a total of 1553 in the NGO category 
(15%) which we judged would more accurately be re-assigned to other 
categories, mostly (n=150) to the sub-category ‘trade, business and professional 
associations’. Among the many examples at the turn of 2013 were Qantas 
Airways Limited, the Federation of European Private Port Operators, the 
International Organisation of Aluminium Aerosol Container Manufacturers, the 
Architects’ Council of Europe, the German Association of Political Consultants, 
and the Malta Stock Exchange plc. There are also impressionistic consequences, 
in that the presentation of category head-counts is one of the first entry points 
to the tabular information on the TR web pages. 
Another area flagged by the JTRS as a target for checks are entries for lobbying 
expenditure which lie at the extremes of ranges. Extremely high outliers have a 
transient life on the register, suggesting some monitoring is in place. The first 
Annual Review of the TR by the JTRS in November 2012 identifies an average of 
15 checks undertaken each week, with 40% of these revealing problematic 
entries. Data quality has been somewhat reliant upon scrutiny of entries 
undertaken by outside campaigners, and its improvement is one of the goals 
identified in the Review. One practical means to achieve this involves the 
progressive introduction of IT tools by the JTRS aimed at improving the 
efficiency of its random checks (JTRS, 2012a, p.10). The European Commission 
had at one time considered an external monitoring agency, but rejected the idea 
on the grounds that to do so would blur the lines of accountability for relations 
with interest groups (Commission, 2007).  
The Path Dependency of the Transparency Register  
Whilst the TR resulted from a merger of registration schemes operated by the 
European Commission and European Parliament, it most closely resembles the 
Commission’s preceding ROIR scheme in concept and in operationalisation, 
10 
 
symbolised by the Commission’s leadership of the JTRS. The TR followed each of 
its predecessors in incentivising registration, but leans more towards the legacy 
of the ROIR in providing the public with information about lobbying 
organisations. The Parliament’s Accredited Lobbyist scheme had been based 
upon the registration of individuals in exchange for signing a code and an access 
pass to EP buildings, and provided no public information from registration 
returns beyond (from 2003) listing on its website the names of pass-holders and 
their employing organisations (de Castro Asarta, 2011). Contrary to the 
nomenclature of the Accredited Lobbyist scheme, the TR web pages follow the 
ROIR in making explicit that registration should not be used to imply 
accreditation. Rather, the TR orientation lies with generating useful public 
information, instead of creating access arrangements to political institutions for 
elites, helping to place the scheme in a tradition concerned with legitimacy. 
The Transparency Register lies embedded within a family of procedures with a 
twin track heritage, the European Commission’s White Paper on Governance 
(WPG), and the High Level Mandelkern Report on Better Regulation, each of 
2001. The Mandelkern Report had been prompted by criticisms about the 
technical quality of policy outputs from the European Commission (Radaelli, 
2004), while the White Paper on Governance was notable for its focus upon 
inputs from civic participation as a pathway towards legitimacy. The result was a 
set of procedures formalising interaction between the European Commission and 
civil society in which legitimacy is sought from the process of involvement in 
shaping public policies, whether by technical improvement of their quality, or via 
the act of involvement itself. In this drive towards ‘participatory governance’ 
(Heidbreder, 2012), minimum standards for consultation and for the use of 
expertise were articulated in 2002, and embedded within a regime of impact 
assessment in the years immediately following. The process of establishing an 
‘Access to Documents’ instrument of 2001 had involved articulating an 
underlying discourse about transparency as a necessary pre-condition for 
legitimate governance, which was used explicitly in justification for a new 
‘European Transparency Initiative’ (ETI) by Commissioner Kallas first announced 
in 2005. Article 11 of the 2009 Treaty on European Union now establishes and 
summarises the underlying concepts of participatory governance (but not the 
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instruments themselves) as principles with the status of law. The embeddedness 
of the TR within a set of wider governance arrangements orientated towards 
legitimacy meets core criteria for lobby regulation schemes recommended by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2009a).  
The main concern of Commissioner Kallas had been to establish the ROIR in the 
first instance, rather than to be overly concerned with points of operational 
detail with it. Once the ROIR was launched, Kallas was driven by achieving a 
‘headline figure’ for the number of registrations, orientated towards a target of 
‘2,600 interest groups with a permanent office in the capital of Europe’ he had 
prominently mentioned in his ETI launch speech to justify the need for regulation 
(Kallas, 2005, p.5). His team declined to provide guidance as to how to compile 
disclosure information about lobbying spending and head counts, other than 
advising organisations to make a ‘good faith estimate’ (Hood, 2009). 
Organisations were able to skip questions on these factors entirely during the 
ROIR on-line registration process. With a ‘light touch’ in administrative 
oversight, and the equivalent of only one full-time individual (in the main, an 
intern) providing operational duties on it, large numbers of organisations in the 
ROIR often entered skimpy or implausible data, or none at all on some key 
disclosure factors (ALTER-EU 2009 & 2011). The ROIR launched in 2008 
therefore had something of the feel of an experiment about it, but left a 
problematic culture of minimalism in data returns for its successor to seek to 
combat.  
Both the ROIR and the EP AL scheme had been designated a ‘lowly regulated’ 
category in a comparative assessment of lobby regulation measures undertaken 
on behalf of the Council of Europe, published just before the Transparency 
Register came into force (Chari, Hogan and Murphy 2011). These authors had 
assigned schemes to their lowest regulated category which did not recognise 
executive branch lobbyists, nor involve the filing of spending reports, where 
there was no ‘cooling-off’ period on leaving political institutions, and where there 
was little by way of enforcement mechanisms (Chari, Hogan and Murphy, 2011). 
Whilst these failings applied to the EP AL scheme, the ROIR had elements of 
each of these regulatory features (or separately, in the case of requirements 
12 
 
placed upon Commissioners when leaving office)7. The ROIR also involved 
disclosure of spending in categories, and income.  
The reputational based enforcement mechanisms (suspension or exclusion from 
the register) of the TR continue a tradition from the ROIR. They are particularly 
significant for commercial affairs consultancies; in 2009 GPlus felt the effect on 
its client base after being suspended from the ROIR for four weeks after 
including in its data return an explanatory note that three clients had not been 
identified at their request (EurActiv, 2009). Since the establishment of the ROIR, 
leading members of ALTER-EU have played an active role in monitoring 
registers, presenting complaints against some of the most prominent business 
organisations active at EU level. Where its complaints have been upheld, the 
reputational damage has contributed towards a ‘trickle down’ effect of a general 
improvement in the quality of data about organisations which regularly lobby the 
EU. Thus, the lobby spending declarations for two subjects of complaints, the 
European Chemicals Industry Association and Business Europe, has increased 
from an implausible €50,000 entry for each in the original ROIR, to €6 million 
and €4 million respectively in the current Transparency Register. Nonetheless, 
neither disclosure requirements nor enforcement mechanisms which the TR 
inherited from the ROIR compare with the extensive arrangements of schemes in 
north America.   
The data covered by the Transparency Register 
A change of name to the Transparency Register extended the scope of coverage 
by making it easier to join for organisations which objected to being included on 
a Register of Interest Representatives. The reinforcement of this by the ‘black 
bold line’ separating producer interests from others was also a new feature of 
the TR. There is also a change of justificatory discourse. Whereas the ETI Green 
Paper of 2006 had articulated the ‘legitimacy of lobbying’ (de Castro Asarta, 
2011), the words introducing the TR on its web site centre upon the citizen 
alongside ambitious discourse about ‘avoiding privileged access to information 
and to decision makers’.  
The ultimate test for registers is the extent to which they cover the population 
regularly lobbying political institutions. The ROIR had attracted more than 4000 
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registrations prior to the switch to the TR. The strengthened incentives to 
register in the TR led its new custodians, Commission Vice-President Šefčovič 
and EP Vice-President Wallis, to describe it as ‘de-facto mandatory’ (Moss, 2011, 
p.25). In dispute of this claim, ALTER-EU released a report entitled ‘Dodgy Data’ 
in mid 2012 to coincide with the first anniversary of the TR. The report listed 120 
companies and 68 lobby consulting firms not on the Register but with a Brussels 
address identified in either of the two most popular commercially available 
directories of EU lobby organisations8 (ALTER-EU, 2012a). Of those listed, nine 
companies and twelve consultancies have since registered. Whilst the remaining 
total of 167 absentees represents a relatively small proportion of the 2095 
entries in the TR with an office in Brussels, the proportion they represent relative 
to their categories is much larger. When the 111 absentee companies are added 
to the population of companies in the TR with a base in Brussels (303), the 
absentees constitute 27% (111 of 414) of the total. The equivalent figure for 
consultancies (self employed or otherwise) is 24% (56 of 233). The missing 
constituency thus constitutes 25.8%.  We then compared the contents of the 
‘NGO’ category of the Register with a list of 122 member organisations we 
identified from the websites of eight ‘families’ of EU NGOs9 as constituted at EU 
level or with an EU policy office in Brussels.  This represents a sample size of 
35% of all NGOs representing a European interest with an office in Belgium, a 
size large enough to make generalisations about the population of NGOs 
representing a European interest.  41% of our sample (50) did not have an entry 
in the Transparency Register, which we offer as an indicative proportion of NGO 
coverage, i.e. around 60%. From this analysis, it seems that the label ‘de-facto 
mandatory’ is not as yet justified. It is possible that some organisations may 
(incorrectly) consider they had ‘indirect’ registrations through their membership 
of another organisation on the register. The budget airline Ryanair made such a 
claim in respect of its membership of the Association of European Airlines 
(Crosbie, 2012), just prior to the establishment of an explicit guideline to the 
contrary on the TR web site.10 
The consulting firms on the ALTER-EU list range from those with a single 
practitioner through to multi-service global law practices. Law practices base a 
refusal to register on client confidentiality norms, and because the JTRS acts as 
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judge and jury. These arguments are undermined by the presence of five 
international law firms offering consultancy services on the Register. For the 
remainder, the advantage of being able to recruit clients who do not wish their 
business to be disclosed is used as an argument in favour of a mandatory 
scheme (ALTER-EU, 2012b). However, they are a relatively small segment of the 
EU lobbying population as a whole. One indicator is that 15 law firms held a 
European Parliament access pass when the scheme was not conditional upon 
signing up to the Transparency Register (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2009), 
compared with 1,179 organisations on the Transparency Register which had at 
least one person with access accreditation to the European Parliament at the 
start of 2013. Commissioner Šefčovič recently announced his willingness to meet 
law firms (and consultancies) part-way with consideration of an exceptional 
formula where there are client confidentiality concerns (Šefčovič, 2012). 
The EP pass is one among a number of incentives to join the Transparency 
Register. A potentially strong incentive is that EU institutions reserve the right to 
restrict invitations to meetings to registered organisations, in that discussions 
with key stakeholder organisations over the details of specific policy are held in a 
variety of consultative forums. In practice, the European Commission does not 
exclude non-registered organisations, but at most prominently invites them to 
join the TR, whether in bi-lateral or multi-lateral meeting settings. And the web 
pages of Commission consultative fora vary; those for DG Trade’s Dialogue with 
Civil Society prominently reinforce the importance of being on the Transparency 
Register, whereas web pages about DG Sanco’s EU Health Policy Forum make no 
mention of it and its membership list includes a number of non-registered 
organisations. However, a ‘naming and shaming device’ lists respondents to 
consultations which are not on the Transparency Register separately from others 
in the follow up reports available on the European Commission’s consultation 
portal, ‘Your Voice in Europe’.  
The expansion of operational guidelines from the ROIR to TR to identify a list of 
activities and structures covered by, and exempt from, the register seems to 
have had the effect of capturing the majority of its intended targets. However, 
without active administrative intervention there is nothing to deter registrations 
motivated solely by an opportunity for free publicity. Around two-thirds of 
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entries on the register (34.9%; n=1917) do not identify ‘European’ among the 
territorial levels of interests they represent.  A number of bizarre, and often 
amusing, examples can be found in the register, with little or no apparent 
connection to EU lobbying. Whilst their presence seems to some to discredit the 
register, they are ‘distracting noise’ when set against the progress made with 
improving the quality of entries for the main players active on the Brussels 
scene. NGOs demanding transparency from others have understood the need to 
set an example, with ALTER-EU circulating a methodological template amongst 
its 200+ members and beyond. Some companies have used this methodology to 
calculate their own data entries, while others follow guidelines from SEAP and 
the European Public Affairs Consultancies Association (EPACA). The result has 
been a gradual drift upwards in data quality since the start of the TR, with the 
most complete entries from those campaigning for higher standards, and from 
those in their line of fire. 
Using the Transparency Register data: a case study 
Whilst the Transparency Register database is freely downloadable, converting it 
into a usable format remains a task beyond most lay IT users. Having 
undertaken this with help from specialists, we then sought to see how useable 
the data might be by working with it at a level of detail. 
Our first task was to remove duplicated entries (1811). We then re-assigned the 
240 mis-placed entries in the NGO category to other categories; whilst this 
produces a more accurate picture of the categories, it carries the consequence of 
including among producer categories a relatively small number of entries which 
had provided information to a slightly different structure of questions, and in 
particular optional (though mostly provided) reporting of spending data. Table 1 
details the newly established population of the Transparency Register by 
category and sub-category: 
TABLE 1 HERE 
Thus, just under one-third of the register are ‘trade, business and professional 
associations’, slightly under one-quarter are NGOs, around one in seven entries 
are companies, and one in nine are consultancies. Territorially, 85.6% have a 
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headquarters in the EU15, and 91.8% in the EU28. There were 455 registrations 
with headquarters outside the EU, of which around one-quarter (121) were from 
the USA, and almost one-fifth (84) from Switzerland.  
We assessed the extent to which the data in the register would allow us to 
establish whether it is populated mainly by organisations primarily orientated to 
engaging the EU. We found it could not do so with any precision, although using 
combinations of responses from 2-3 questions does allow a core of such 
organisations to be identified. When registering, organisations have the option to 
select up to four territorial levels of interest they represent: sub-national, 
national, European, and global. Almost two-thirds of all entries (65.1%; 
n=3577) identified that the interests they represent were European, raising 
some doubt as to the relevance of other entries. There was relatively minor 
variation between categories I-V, ranging from three-quarters of professional 
consultancies (74.5% - 306) to 56.5% (437) of companies. Another question 
asks for the location of a headquarters, supplemented by a non-compulsory 
invitation ‘here you can enter more contact details for your organisation that you 
think useful (e.g. contact details of its Brussels office)’. 1,360 organisations 
identified a headquarters in Belgium, of which 1207 were in Brussels, and a 
further 888 organisations outside of Belgium identify a supplementary address in 
Brussels. This brings the total known to have a Brussels address to 2095. This is 
clearly the core of the population engaging the Commission and the Parliament, 
but there are other organisations in the TR which do so and which have no 
Brussels address. These additional organisations will primarily be from locations 
within around three hours door-to-door commuting distance of the EU 
institutions. The best available, though imprecise, indication of the size of this 
population from TR data is provided by the number of organisations (145) with a 
headquarters in neighbouring countries which have at least one person with 
access accreditation to the European Parliament (France 52; Germany 35; the 
UK 34; the Netherlands 20; Luxembourg 4). Around the time we captured the 
data at the start of 2013 the population of organisations with at least one pass 
to the European Parliament (1,179) was still growing at a rate of around 30 per 
week (JTRS, 2012a). Nonetheless, the core of organisations with a significant 
level of engagement with EU institutions seems more complete with than without 
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them. When we added them to organisations on the Transparency Register 
which indicate a European interest with an address in Brussels, we then 
assessed the population distribution across sub-categories. We found that the 
distribution does not differ markedly from the population of the register as a 
whole, and may be accounted for by differences in trends among categories in 
joining the register. The results suggest that each interest segment seems able 
to establish itself close to the seat of EU decision making in approximate 
proportion to their size of the lobbying population covered by the Transparency 
Register.  
The number of organisations on the Register which had at least one person with 
access accreditation to the European Parliament (1179) was lower than might be 
expected, accounting for just over one-fifth of all TR registrations. The growth in 
this population of the Register follows a long period of stagnation after a high 
profile ‘Cash for Amendments’ scandal in the EP in the spring of 2011, described 
in more detail in the next section. Whilst we were looking to evaluate the extent 
to which the EP access pass is an incentive to join the TR, the current population 
growth rate makes it too early to draw any firm conclusions about this. 81% 
(953) of organisations with at least one person with EP access accreditation have 
an address in Brussels, comprising 45% of all organisations with an address in 
Brussels (Table 3). The important message from Table 3 below is that variation 
between the main categories is not great; 58.1% (176) of companies with a 
Brussels office, compared to 54.9% (124) of Brussels address consultancies, and 
47.1% (193) of NGOs with a Brussels address. Organisations with an address in 
Brussels held an average of 2.5 individuals with accreditation, ranging from 3.03 
for consultancies through to 2.17 for NGOs. Consultancies hold the first five 
places for the number of accredited individuals, including one outlier (Burson 
Marsteller) with 44; Greenpeace is unusual among NGOs with 13 passes, placing 
it in eighth position among all organisations.  
TABLE 2 HERE 
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Spending and lobbying personnel data: producer organisations and NGOs 
compared 
The calculation of EU lobbying spending (for consultancies, by share of turnover) 
and head-counts of those involved in EU lobbying activities are the most 
demanding data components for registrants, requiring the application of 
guidelines with scope for wide differences of interpretation. The JTRS guidelines 
on these points are more detailed than for any other indicator, though 
supplemented by further advice from practitioner self-help guides. Most 
registrants seem to have engaged with guidelines sufficient to enter plausible 
data, but even the mainstream EU organisations range widely in interpretation 
when asked to ‘estimate the costs related to the direct representation of 
interests to EU institutions by your organisation in the current year,’ from a 
minor portion of their total expenditure through to all of it.  
 
Beyond interpretative issues, the TR and its predecessors have suffered a 
continuing supply of implausible entries at the high extremes of both spending 
and head-count ranges.  Some are no more than simple data entry errors; 
during the time we were writing this article, the entry for the European Women’s 
Lobby (with a budget of €1,111,853) changed from €7.5m-7.75m to €800-900k. 
There are a larger number of implausible head-count reports. The origin of this 
may lie in a question which requires systemic knowledge in seeking the ‘number 
of persons engaged in activities falling under the scope of the Transparency 
Register’. There are a number of cases where estimates result in the entry of an 
entire workforce rather than the number of EU lobbyists. Thus, 104 
organisations in the NGO category each claim to have more than 50 people 
engaged in EU lobbying activities; by way of comparison the best staffed EU 
business association, the European Chemicals Industry Association (CEFIC), is at 
the high end in a declaration of 72 such staff. 
The use of ranges for spending reporting, rather than the need to calculate a 
precise figure, help to drive up the number of returns from (mostly non-
producer) categories for which disclosure is not compulsory. Almost three 
quarters (74.2% - 968) of all NGOs provided information (rising to 80.5% - 277 
when restricted to NGOs based in Belgium with a European interest) in the 
ranges data field. A number which entered no information in the data field stated 
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an exact figure in the accompanying comments field. Producer related interests 
(Categories I and II) have a choice of spending format (absolute or in ranges), 
and other categories report in ranges; 82.6% of the former chose to report in 
ranges, assisting the task of aggregating comparable data. Where we assessed 
the reporting of absolute figures, we excluded from our analysis a small number 
of reports of €2 or less from Category II, and less than €100 for Category I. 
The most striking picture which emerges from the data is that the differences 
between Categories I (consultancies) and II (business related and trade union 
interests), and Category III (NGOs), are not as great as might be expected. For 
head-counts, 90.3% (560) of consultancies (Category I) and 86.3% (2433) of 
Category II report between 1 and 10 people engaged in EU lobbying activities, 
whereas 75% (978) of NGOs (Category III) report 1-10. When we restricted the 
comparison of head counts to Belgian based organisations with a European 
interest the differences were narrower, ranging from 88% (Category II) to 82% 
(282) (Category III). One quartile of European NGOs with a Brussels address 
have 1-2 lobbying personnel (25.9%-89), another quartile between 6 and 15 
(27.6% - 95), and around one-third (35.5% - 122) have 3-5.  
For spending in ranges (Table 3), 67% of Categories I and II; 67%-1823), and 
79.1% (765) of NGOs (Category III) report less than €100,000. When 
comparing Belgian based organisations with a European interest the differences 
were similar, with 51.2% categories I and II (together), and 63.6%of category 
III (176) reporting less than €100,000. 
TABLE 3 HERE 
After discounting unreliable looking cases, we assessed spending reports from 
ranges as well as absolute figures. There were five entries exceeding €4.25m in 
Category I (Table 4), and 13 in Category II (Table 5). Ten Brussels based EU 
NGOs organisations reported spending above €800,000, and five over €1m 
(Table 6).  
TABLE 4 HERE 
TABLE 5 HERE 
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TABLE 6 HERE 
Table 7 presents the largest spending declarations among EU business 
associations; of note is that four German associations are among the top 20 EU 
lobbying spenders, among other spenders organised at EU level.  
TABLE 7 HERE 
Because the extent of funding of interest organisations is a remarkable feature 
of the EU system of interest representation, we examined the constituency of 
organisations with a Brussels address and a European interest field which held a 
grant from one of the EU institutions12. Almost one fifth (19.3% - 405) of this 
population had received a grant during the 12 months preceding their 
registration. 41.2% (169) of NGOs, and 31% (31) of the small sample of trade 
unions, had received a grant during the preceding 12 months. One NGO with a 
Brussels office, Food and Water (Watch) Europe, receives an EU grant of €6.4m, 
comprising 96.7% of its total budget. EU grants contribute an average of 42.9% 
of the total budget among this population of NGOs which provided budget 
information (330). 17.5% of companies (53), and 10.7% (84) 
trade/business/professional associations had received an EU grant in the 
preceding 12 months, although these mostly relate to participation in the EU’s 
research and technology development programmes, often alongside university 
partners. 
The Transparency Register in comparative perspective 
Six EU member states currently have schemes regulating interest representation 
in some form, nine have measures under consideration, and in a further two 
countries measures have been either formally considered and rejected (Italy) or 
adopted and then abandoned (Hungary, 2006-2011). Schemes commenced in 
Lithuania in 2001, Poland in 2005,13 France in 2009 and in Austria and Slovenia 
in 2011. The earlier schemes among these have a small number of entries 
(Kalnins, 2011). Longer standing instruments in Germany are more linked to 
access arrangements and an era where corporatist practices were at their peak 
(Pross, 2007; JTRS, 2012a). There have been active recent debates about 
establishing new lobby regulation instruments in Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
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Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Italy Latvia, Romania, and the United 
Kingdom. Schemes elsewhere on the European continent exist in Georgia and 
Macedonia, and are under consideration in Bosnia, Macedonia, Switzerland, 
Turkey and the Ukraine (Chari, Hogan and Murphy, 2011; Holman and Luneburg 
2012; JTRS, 2012a).   
Debates in European territories have been influenced by the discourse 
surrounding comparative lobby regulation instruments, in which the TR (and 
predecessors), as well as longer standing schemes in north America, have 
featured prominently. Schemes in these latter territories are regarded by a wide 
range of commentators as those with the highest standards (Pross, 2006; OECD, 
2009a Chari, Hogan and Murphy, 2010 and 2011; Kalnins, 2011; Holman and 
Luneburg, 2012). These reports share a counsel against the simple transposition 
of regulatory devices across territories, and particularly across continents, citing 
arrangements in some European countries designed to institutionalise business 
associations and trade unions within corporatist governance arrangements 
(Pross, 2007; Holman and Luneburg, 2012). In consequence, OECD’s ’10 
principles for transparency and integrity in lobbying’ counsel an appraisal of 
lessons learned in other systems and the extent to which these can be applied to 
their own context (OECD, n.d). Instruments aimed at the regulation of lobbyists 
at EU level first took appraisal of these lessons at an early stage.  
Despite differences of context, lobby regulation schemes tend to have a core 
set of linked drivers (Pross, 2007). A starting point often involves a case of 
corruption, sometimes so high profile that it becomes cited in discourse well 
beyond the territory where the events occurred. Thus, the ‘Abramoff scandal’ 
in the United States is widely quoted in justificatory discourse elsewhere; 
Kallas explicitly cited the wish to avoid a ‘European Abramoff’ in his speech 
announcing the ETI (Kallas, 2005). Journalists posing as lobbyists tried this 
out by offering ‘cash for amendments’ to Members of the European Parliament 
in early spring 2011. There were three takers, one of whom was an Austrian 
MEP (and former domestic Minister) subsequently jailed for the offence. The 
scandal was a strong factor in changing the EP access element from a twelve 
month pass under the Accredited Lobbyist scheme, to the current 
arrangement of twelve months accreditation for a one day access pass issued 
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by a special desk in the EP entrance foyer. The new (2012) scheme in Austria 
which followed the scandal, as well as one in Slovenia which preceded it by a 
year, each involve mandatory registration of lobbyists, and used as supporting 
evidence for the claim of ‘Europe’s new wave of strong lobbying regulation’ 
(Holman and Luneburg, p.91).  
Conclusions 
Does the Transparency Register component of EU lobby regulation place it in 
the vanguard of a ‘new wave’ of strong lobby regulation? If the criterion is the 
extent to which it places information in the public domain, the answer must 
be a qualified ‘yes.’ There are now more than 5,500 individual entries, of 
which one-third did not select ‘European’ among the territorial level of 
interests they represent.  We estimate that around three-quarters of business 
related organisations active in engaging EU political institutions are in the 
register, and around 60% of NGOs with a European interest are in the 
register. Not quite ‘de-facto mandatory’, but substantial when compared to 
the rather small number of entries in some of the national registers to have 
emerged in Europe in recent years. The quality of the data in the 
Transparency Register has progressively improved if the starting point was its 
predecessor schemes. Whilst some data quality problems remain, with a 
steady supply of quirky (but nonetheless transient) entries, the reliance upon 
those in the register to monitor it has driven up standards of data entry 
among the main lobbying players. Nonetheless, there are faults of design and 
nomenclature, resulting in 15% of entries in the NGO category being 
somewhat mis-placed, influencing the extent of public disclosure from this 
constituency. All of these issues will doubtless be considered in the upcoming 
review of the scheme, including the key question as to its voluntary nature. 
For research use, the identification of a ‘European interest’ represented and 
use of a Brussels address makes the data less prone to quirky outliers. 
Nonetheless, there are limits in aggregating data on some indicators 
(particularly head-counts of those engaged in EU lobbying activities) because 
of the extent of outliers. However, some clear pictures emerge from the data, 
including a key finding that differences in reported resources are less than 
might be expected between business related organisations and NGOs. And we 
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can now know much more about EU lobbying from the available data, 
including about a key feature which differentiates it from other political 
systems, the extent of public funding of civil society organisations and their 
relative dependence upon it. This helps gives rise to other research questions, 
such as the extent to which the reliance by recipients upon EU funding creates 
dependencies. The available data informs analysis which can contribute to 
reviewing measures in place at EU level, and at a time when most EU member 
states have established regulatory instruments or currently have them under 
active consideration.  
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Table 1: Transparency Register: population by category 
Category Sample % 
I - Professional consultancies/law firms/self-employed 
consultants 620 11.3% 
Law firms 42 0.8% 
Professional consultancies 411 7.5% 
Self-employed consultants 167 3% 
II - In-house lobbyists and trade/professional associations 2816 51.2% 
Companies & groups 774 14.1% 
Other similar organisations 209 3.8% 
Trade unions 123 2.2% 
Trade, business & professional associations 1710 31.1% 
III - Non-governmental organisations 1304 23.8% 
Non-governmental organisations, platforms and networks 
and similar 1304 23.8% 
IV - Think tanks, research and academic institutions 411 7.5% 
Academic institutions 128 2.3% 
Think tanks and research institutions 283 5.2% 
V - Organisations representing churches and religious 
communities 37 0.7% 
Organisations representing churches and religious 
communities 37 0.7% 
VI - Organisations representing local, regional and municipal 
authorities, other public or mixed entities, etc. 306 5.6% 
Local, regional and municipal authorities (at sub-national 
level) 128 2.3% 
Other public or mixed entities, etc. 178 3.2% 
  TOTAL 5494 100% 
Source: own analysis. Sample without duplicates and after reassigning 240 producer 
organisations in NGO category to relevant categories, as of 5.01.2013. 
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Table 2: European Parliament Access Pass holding organisations with 
Brussels address by Transparency Register category 
Category 
n. with 
Brussels  
address 
n. with at 
least 1 
EP pass 
% 
I - Professional consultancies/law firms/self-
employed consultants 
226 124 54.9% 
a Law firms 13 4 30.8% 
b Professional consultancies 161 101 62.7% 
c Self-employed consultants 52 19 36.5% 
II - In-house lobbyists and trade/professional 
associations 
1209 541 44.7% 
a Companies & groups 303 176 58.1% 
b Other similar organisations 76 40 52.6% 
c Trade unions 42 18 42.9% 
d Trade, business & professional associations 788 307 39.0% 
III - Non-governmental organisations 410 193 47.1% 
a Non-governmental organisations, platforms 
and networks and similar 
410 193 47.1% 
IV - Think tanks, research and academic 
institutions 
95 36 37.9% 
a Academic institutions 12 4 33.3% 
b Think tanks and research institutions 83 32 38.6% 
V - Organisations representing churches and 
religious communities 
14 10 71.4% 
a Organisations representing churches and 
religious communities 
14 10 71.4% 
VI - Organisations representing local, regional and 
municipal authorities, other public or mixed 
entities, etc. 
141 47 33.3% 
a Local, regional and municipal authorities (at 
sub-national level) 
69 14 20.3% 
b Other public or mixed entities, etc. 72 33 45.8% 
 TOTAL 2095 951 45.4% 
Source: own analysis. Sample without duplicates and after reassigning 240 producer 
organisations in NGO category to relevant categories, as of 5.01.2013. 
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Table 3: EU lobbying spending ranges by category 
Organisations disclosing lobbying 
spending in bands Below 50.000 
50.000 - 
100.000  
 
100.000 - 
500.000  
(8 ranges) 
500.000 -
1.000.000  
(5 ranges) 
Above 
1.000.000  
(37 ranges) 
Category A B B/A C C/A D D/A E E/A F F/A 
I - Professional 
consultancies/law 
firms/self-employed 
consultants* 
488 257 52.7% 57 11.7% 118 24.2% 22 4.5% 34 7.0% 
a Law firms 28 19 67.9% 6 21.4% 1 3.6% 1 3.6% 1 3.6% 
b Professional consultancies 337 152 45.1% 38 11.3% 97 28.8% 17 5.0% 33 9.8% 
c Self-employed consultants 123 86 69.9% 13 10.6% 20 16.3% 4 3.3% 0 0.0% 
II - In-house lobbyists and 
trade/professional 
associations* 
2232 1232 55.2% 277 12.4% 598 26.8% 64 2.9% 61 2.7% 
a Companies & groups 651 275 42.2% 82 12.6% 233 35.8% 34 5.2% 27 4.1% 
b Other similar organisations 158 102 64.6% 17 10.8% 36 22.8% 1 0.6% 2 1.3% 
c Trade unions 97 71 73.2% 7 7.2% 13 13.4% 1 1.0% 5 5.2% 
d 
Trade, business & 
professional 
associations 
1326 784 59.1% 171 12.9% 316 23.8% 28 2.1% 27 2.0% 
III - Non-governmental 
organisations 968 659 68.1% 106 11.0% 164 16.9% 18 1.9% 21 2.2% 
a 
Non-governmental 
organisations, 
platforms and 
networks and similar 
968 659 68.1% 106 11.0% 164 16.9% 18 1.9% 21 2.2% 
IV - Think tanks, research 
and academic institutions 275 199 72.4% 29 10.5% 38 13.8% 2 0.7% 7 2.5% 
a Academic institutions 84 55 65.5% 13 15.5% 12 14.3%   0.0% 4 4.8% 
b Think tanks and research institutions 191 144 75.4% 16 8.4% 26 13.6% 2 1.0% 3 1.6% 
V - Organisations 
representing churches 
and religious communities 
27 19 70.4% 3 11.1% 4 14.8% 0 0.0% 1 3.7% 
a 
Organisations 
representing churches 
and religious 
communities 
27 19 70.4% 3 11.1% 4 14.8% 0  0.0% 1 3.7% 
VI - Organisations 
representing local, 
regional and municipal 
authorities, other public 
or mixed entities, etc. 
182 91 50.0% 30 16.5% 47 25.8% 8 4.4% 6 3.3% 
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a 
Local, regional and 
municipal authorities 
(at sub-national level) 
86 40 46.5% 14 16.3% 25 29.1% 4 4.7% 3 3.5% 
b Other public or mixed entities, etc. 96 51 53.1% 16 16.7% 22 22.9% 4 4.2% 3 3.1% 
  TOTAL 4172 2457 58.9% 502 12.0% 969 23.2% 114 2.7% 130 3.1% 
Source: own analysis. Sample without duplicates and after reassigning 240 producer 
organisations previously in NGO category to relevant categories, as of 5.01.2013. 
*Category I and II have a choice of disclosing their lobbying spending as a band or an 
absolute figure. 
 
 
Table 4: Top 5 lobbying spending EU political consultancies  
 
Name 
Share of turnover related to 
representing interests to EU 
institutions on behalf of 
clients (in €) Subcategory 
1 Beiten Burkhardt € Above 10,000,000 Law firms 
2 
 
Fleishman-Hillard € 9,915,957 
Professional 
consultancies 
3 Burson-Marsteller € 8,755,000 
Professional 
consultancies 
4 
Hill & Knowlton 
International Belgium € 4,550,000 
Professional 
consultancies 
5 APCO Worldwide € 4,500,000 - 4,750,000 
Professional 
consultancies 
    Source: own analysis. TR data as of 5.01.2013.  
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Table 5: Business related organisations EU lobbying spending  
over €4.25m 
 
 
Name 
Estimated costs to the 
organisation directly related 
to representing interests to 
EU institutions in that year 
(in €) Subcategory 
1 
Association for Financial 
Markets in Europe  €Above 10,000,000 
Trade, business & 
professional associations 
2 
Enel Ingegneria e Ricerca 
S.p.A. € Above 10,000,000 Companies & groups 
3 Ericsson € 8,750,000 - 9,000,000 Companies & groups 
4 Accenture International SARL € 8,250,000 - 8,500,000 Companies & groups 
5 European Seed Association € 8,250,000 - 8,500,000 
Trade, business & 
professional associations 
6 
BIPAR - European Federation 
of Insurance Intermediaries € 6,000,000 - 6,250,000 Other similar organisations 
7 
European Chemical Industry 
Council €  6,000,000 
Trade, business & 
professional associations 
8 
ExxonMobil Petroleum & 
Chemical € 4,750,000 - 5,000,000 Companies & groups 
9 
Union Européenne du 
Commerce du Bétail et des 
Métiers de la Viande 
€ 4,750,000 - 5,000,000 Trade, business & professional associations 
10 Siemens AG € 4,729,533 Companies & groups 
11 Microsoft Corporation € 4,500,000 - 4,750,000 Companies & groups 
12 
European Aeronautic 
Defence and Space Company € 4,250,000 - 4,500,000 Companies & groups 
Source: own analysis. TR data as of 5.01.2013. Organisations decide whether to 
report their costs as a range or absolute figure. 
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Table 6: NGOs with EU lobby spending above €1million 
 Name of the NGO 
Estimated costs to the organisation 
directly related to representing 
interests to EU institutions in that 
year (in €) 
1 CIDSE - International Alliance of Catholic development agencies €3,500,000 - 3,750,000 
2 BEUC – European Consumers Union €1,450,000 
3 CONCORD Europe €1,250,000 - 1,500,000 
4 Eurogroup for Animals €1,250,000 - 1,500,000 
5 European Citizen Action Service €1,000,000 - 1,250,000 
6 
OCEANA €1,000,000 - 1,250,000 
Source: own analysis. TR data as of 5.01.2013. NGOs are asked to report their interest 
representation costs as a range. BEUC provides information on its costs in the box for 
additional financial information. 
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Table 7: Business Associations declaring EU lobbying spending  
above €2 million 
 
Name of Association 
Estimated costs to the organisation 
directly related to representing 
interests to EU institutions in that year 
(in €) 
1 Association for Financial Markets in Europe € Above 10,000,000 
2 European Seed Association € 8,250,000  - 8,500,000 
3 European Chemical Industry Council € 6,000,000 
3 Union Européenne du Commerce du Bétail et des Métiers de la Viande € 4,750,000 - 5,000,000 
4 European Banking Federation € 4,250,000 – 4,500,000 
5 BUSINESSEUROPE € 4,000,000 - 4,250,000 
6 
Association de l'Aviculture, de l'Industrie et du 
Commerce de Volailles dans les Pays de l'Union 
Europeenne asbl 
€ 3,750,000 – 4,000,000 
7 Verband der Chemischen Industrie e.V. € 3,570,000 
8 Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V. € 3,100,000 
9 BDEW Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft e. V. € 2,500,000 - 2,750,000 
10 European Federation of the Cotton and Allied Textile Industries  € 2,250,000 -  2,500,000 
11 Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft e.V. € 2,250,000 – 2,500,000 
12 Association des Constructeurs Européens d'Automobiles € 2,000,000 - 2,250,000 
13 Bundesverband deutscher Banken e.V. € 2,000,000 -  2,250,000 
14 EUROCHAMBRES – Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry € 2,000,000 – 2,250,000 
Source: own analysis. TR data as of 5.01.2013. Records from sub category ‘Trade, 
business & professional associations’. Organisations decide whether to report their 
costs as a range or absolute figure.
36 
 
Table 8: EU Grant holders by category and Brussels address 
  
ALL 
with EU 
Grant % 
N. With 
Brussels 
address 
Brussels 
address 
with 
grant % 
  I - Professional consultancies/law 
firms/self-employed consultants 620 33 5% 226 13 5.8% 
a Law firms 42 2 5% 13 1 7.7% 
b Professional consultancies 411 25 6% 161 8 5.0% 
c Self-employed consultants 167 6 4% 52 4 7.7% 
II - In-house lobbyists and 
trade/professional associations 2816 284 10% 1209 158 13.1% 
a Companies & groups 774 107 14% 303 53 17.5% 
b Other similar organisations 209 18 9% 76 8 10.5% 
c Trade unions 123 21 17% 42 13 31.0% 
d Trade, business & professional associations 1710 138 8% 788 84 10.7% 
III - Non-governmental organisations 1304 349 27% 410 169 41.2% 
a Non-governmental organisations, platforms and networks and similar 1304 349 27% 410 169 41.2% 
IV - Think tanks, research and academic 
institutions 411 111 27% 95 36 37.9% 
a Academic institutions 128 35 27% 12 7 58.3% 
b Think tanks and research institutions 283 76 27% 83 29 34.9% 
V - Organisations representing churches 
and religious communities 37 2 5% 14 1 7.1% 
a Organisations representing churches and religious communities 37 2 5% 14 1 7.1% 
VI - Organisations representing local, 
regional and municipal authorities, other 
public or mixed entities, etc. 
306 68 44% 141 28 19.9% 
a Local, regional and municipal authorities (at sub-national level) 128 27 21% 69 12 17.4% 
b Other public or mixed entities, etc. 178 41 23% 72 16 22.2% 
SUM: 5494 847 15% 2095 405 19.3% 
 
Source: own analysis. Sample without duplicates and after reassigning 240 producer 
organisations in NGO category to relevant categories, as of 5.01.2013. 
 
 
                                                          
1 The Inter-Institutional Agreement establishing the register identified a review of the scheme by no later than 
2 years following its establishment, i.e. by the end of June 2013.  A reply to a Parliamentary Question in 
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November 2012 from the President of the Commission seems to revise the date to 2014 (Barroso, 2012).  
However, at the time of writing the Commission is actively seeking evaluations to inform the review. 
2 This nomenclature is used throughout the various procedures which structure the European Commission’s 
relationship with outside interests. 
3 37 of the 62 entries from Poland used English as a language to make an entry. Those written in Polish were 
those with mainly national and sub-national interests. 
4 Some public sector organisations, and think tanks, are included in this segment. Because of the relatively 
small proportion of the register they comprise (Categories IV and VI), they are included within the convenient 
shorthand ‘non-producer’ as the questions asked of them are the same as those the main segment of non-
producer interests in the register, Category III (NGOs,etc). 
5 The WPG had floated the idea of creating ‘privileged partnership arrangements’ for groups with preferred 
criteria which included ‘representativeness’, and a brief flirtation with this idea ended when the European 
Commission abandoned its ‘CONECCS’ database of interest groups – to which entry had been conditional upon 
confirming the presence of members in 3 or more member or candidate states - ahead of the establishment of 
the ROIR. The request to identify the geographic spread of membership in four of the categories (NGOs; 
religious organisations; think-tanks and research organisations; territorial authorities) seems to be legacy of a 
preference for territorially representative NGOs in a softer format; it is not a question asked of business 
associations or trade unions. The absence of any consequence attached to it reflects the shift over time from 
regulation orientated towards access to political institutions, to one with other orientations. 
6 ROIR entries were scrutinised as part of the duties allocated to an intern in the Transparency Unit of the 
Secretariat General, overseen by a regular member of staff of the unit. 
7 The extension of a transitional arrangement for staff leaving EU institutions is currently under 
discussion with the trade union representing them. 
8 The European Union and Public Affairs Directory, and Stakeholder EU. Only the first of these was available at 
the time of an evaluation of EU lobby population information sources (Berkhout and Lowery, 2008), but was 
identified in the comparison as the main source of information for corporate representation. 
9 CONCORD; Culture Action Europe; the European Public Health Alliance; EUCIS-LLL (Life Long Learning); the 
European Women’s Lobby, the Green 10, the Human Rights and Development Network; the Social Platform. 
10 Ryanair has since made its own entry on the TR. 
11  One further entry of doubt was removed. 
12 After cleaning the sample of 12 records with less than €50. 
13 The first Annual Review of the Transparency Register by the European Commission (Joint Transparency 
Register, 2012b) states the Polish scheme as established in 1992. Accounts from Polish observers and a 
commentator dispute this, and instead identify 2005 as the date of establishment of schemes which regulate 
lobbyists – for a review see Makowski, 2009). 
